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Predicting the Success 
of Economic Sanctions 
ROBERT E. LOONEY AND CRAIG KNOUSE 
. b n of the outcomes of sanctions. 
This article assesses the predicta. i i y ssess a set of conditions that 
Specifically, do succ~~~l s~7~~~;:rw apart from those that fa!l? 
arc necessary and su1.1'cicn ndcr which a future sanction 
If so, what are the ~ircum( st:nc~huwhat degree of probability) to 
episode would be likely an wi 
attain its stated aims? 
INTRODUCTION 
. casurcs directed toward po-
Economic sanctions arc .coercive m 11 u lementcd by other 
litical objcctives.1 Sanctions are usua rycsstJition of diplomatic, 
h . the severance or · . measures, sue ~s . c main thrust of such measures ts; 
cultural, or sporting tics. Th m of the target. In this sense, 
of course, to wcak~n the c~on~1d~structivc coercion. They a~c 
sanctions ca~ be viewed a~t~ the intent to change that st~tc s 
initiated against a state w . t 'ning the state as a viable 
behavior, while in the process mam at 
political system. t' ns appear to have clear objcc-
On the surface, most sane ioh . the behavior of the 
tivcs. These usually relate t.o c ~~~~~n with sanctions, how-
target govemm~nt: The m~~: ~o be complex and often very 
ever, is that th~1~ im~ac,t te historical record shows that the 
difficult to anticipate. 'The a· t ble and indiscriminate: even 
effects of sanctions a:c .unpr~e~c :averse economic effects, the 
if they produce their mtcn . 11 follow."3 
desired political effects do not automatica y 
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More recently, sanctions have been undertaken for purely 
political reasons. On 9 March 1988, the Parliament of the Euro-
pean Community refused to ratify three economic protocols 
concluded with Israel: 
The objective of these protocols was mainly to protect Israel's interests 
following Spain's and Portugal's entry into the Common Market. The 
parliamentarians who did not give their assent lo thL'SC agreements thought 
that Israel had to be punished for two reasons: first, because it refused to 
allow direct export of Palestinian merchandise from the West Bank and 
Gaza to the European Community; second, because of the attitude of the 
Israeli authorities towards the intifada and the harsh measures taken 
against the Palestinians in the course of the uprising.• 
Whatever their objectives, economic sanctions appear to be 
gaining wider usage as an instrument of foreign policy. Arc 
future sanctions likely to attain their goals, and if so, under what 
circumstances? A recent exhaustive study5 concluded that only 
one-third of prior sanctions can be considered as successful: 
Most observers conclude that trade sanctions arc not successful policy 
instruments. This assessment has held despite the number of countries 
applying sanctions. It also seems to apply regardless of the degree of 
economic damage inflicted on the target country, or the target country's 
level of economic development.• 
In a recent review of the literature, Lindsay asks: "Yet if 
trade sanctions do not work, why do states continue to impose 
them? The answer lies less in the ignorance ,of government 
officials than in the naivete of the research on trade sanctions."7 
And in a major study on the aforementioned European sanc-
tions against Israel, Grcilsammcr observes that, despite the very 
favorable circumstances surrounding the sanctions: 
The reasons for the lack of impact of the sanction on the government's 
policy in the territories are diverse: suppressing the intifada was consid-
ered by the two parties in power a vital, primary aim; within Israel, the 
incidence of the sanction was felt exclusively by the farmers, and the 
economic damage inflicted was not sufficient to unleash domestic political 
pressure that would bring a new policy more in accord with the norms of 
the Community; in Israel, the veto was successfully depicted as an attack 
from the outside upon the population as a whole; the actual identification 
with the sender states was weak.' 
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The issue of the effectiveness of sanctions again came to the 
fore with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Proponents of a military 
solution to the Kuwaiti crisis asserted that there was no proof 
that sanctions would work. Only war, they argued, would 
guarantee that Iraq would get out of Kuwait, and soon. In 
contrast, the CIA's view9 was that sanctions should begin to 
significantly hobble Iraq's economy by the early spring of 1991 :10 
1. Unable to earn money through exports, Iraq should de-
plete its foreign reserves by the spring leaving it little cash with 
which to entice potential sanctions-busters who smuggle goods 
over rural borders. 
2. Economic problems would noticeably worsen by spring 
as Baghdad would shift ever more of its dwindling resources to 
the military and struggle to keep basic services, such as electrical 
power, functioning regularly. 
3. Grain reserves should sustain consumption al l wo-thirds 
of the pre-embargo level until the next harvest in May. But 
despite government incentives to increase food production, "Iraq 
docs not have the capacity to become self-sufficient in food 
production by next year and even a good spring harvest will 
support only about half the pre-embargo levels of grain con-
sumption." 
This view was supported by recent empirical evidence sug-
gesting that the probability of a successful conclusion to the 
sanctions against Iraq was 100 percent: "Even when the model 
is adjusted to account for Mr. Hussein's exceptionally tyrannical 
control, and the estimated cost is say, halved to 24 percent of 
GNP, the probability of success remains above 85 pcrccnt." 11 
Given the fact that Iraq refused to leave Kuwait even after 
weeks of extensive bombing, it is fairly safe to say the sanctions 
would not have resulted in the country's compliance with the 
UN resolutions. Clearly, part of the problem faced by poli-
cymakers in sanctioning countries in assessing the likely effec-
tiveness of sanctions is that past research provides little guid-
ance. The two Middle Eastern cases we have mentioned exem-
plify this: in both cases the conditions for the favorable imposi-
tion of sanctions seemed present; however, in each case the 
sanctions largely failed to meet their stated objectives. Why? 
A major problem with past research on the effectiveness of 
sanctions is that it is often anecdotal, with little basis established 
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for direct comparison of the vari 
failure. Does the main so f ~us elements of success and 
ment? Are sanctions mor urcfte o hailure relate to the environ-
. e o en t an not ap r d · . . 
or enVIronments where th P 1e m s1tuat1ons 
for securing change? Is su~~:~eo~~~ !~e appropria.te instruments 
largely a function of its ob. t. i .ure of a particular sanction 
easier to attain than othcrj,e~v:s, with certain objectives much 
docs little to address th . n o.rtunately, the extant literature 
Th cse questions empirically 
c purpose of this article is t fill h. : 
edge about the effectiveness of eco o . t Is g~p m our knowl-
cifically, we wish to determine if nom1c sanction~. 12 More spc-
set of conditions that are neces~uccessful ~~chons possess a 
apart from those that £, ·1 If ry and suff1c1cnt to set them 
under which a future san~tlo s?, ;hat arc the circumstances 
what degree of probability) ~ocp~~· e.would be li.kcly (and with 
. The results should have sc~c:~~ its.sta~ed a.1ms_? 
important they should .d policy •mphcations. Most 
. ' prov1 c policymak · h . 
concerning the conditions in h' hf er~ wit guidance 
be effective as a foreign poli~ ;~ol.uturc sanctions arc likely to 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
Before we can undertake an cm . . 
tions, several conceptual is/ucs p1~aJ assessment of past sanc-
to say at this point that th t nee to be addressed. It is safe 
depend on: c ou come of any sanction episode will 
1. The objectives of the sanction 
2. ;~c way in which one defines success 
3. c methods of implementation 
In examining each of these issu . 
framework for the empirical tests tha~siotl c aim to develop a 
ow. 
Identification of Goals 
Identification of the goals of th d bcf, c sen er country i 
ore any assessment of the ff, ti s necessary 
c cc vcncss of a oartir11br "'""'~ 
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tion can be made. The issue is not as straightforward as one 
might imagine. Indeed, the literature offers a variety of ap-
proaches and definitions: 
1. Doxey:13 Ideological, political, and economic 
2. Lindsay:14 Compliance, subversion, deterrence, interna-
tional or domestic symbolism 
3. Weintraub:15 Formal, undisclosed, and implicit 
4. Barbcr:16 Primary, secondary, and tertiary 
There is, of course, considerable overlap in the various 
objectives. Also, most of these goals do not have an unambigu-
ous operational form. Finally, objectives do change over time 
and that adds to the difficulty of classifying each episode. 
Hufbauer and Schott categorize the various objectives used 
in past sanction episodes into five major groups. According to 
them, sanctions can be used to: 
1. Change the target country's policies in a somewhat 
modest way. Human rights and nuclear nonprolifera-
tion cases are possible examples. 
2. Undermine the target government. This could also in-
volve, as an ancillary goal, changing the target country's 
policies. Examples of this type of sanction arc the US 
campaign against Castro, and the Soviet campaign against 
Tito. 3. Disrupt a major military adventure. The UK sanctions 
against Argentina during the Falklands conflict arc a 
good example of this situation. 
4. Impair the military potential of the target country, illus-
trated by World Wars I and II and the COCOM sanctions 
against the USSR and its allies. 
5. Change the target country's policies in a major way 
(including surrender of territory). The UN campaign 
against South Africa over apartheid and control of Na-
mibia 17 is a good example of this case. Each of these 
goals involves highly public attempts at coercion. 
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Definition of Success 
Most of the foreign poli 
sition of sanctions arc a C::t~~~e:f~s stemming f~om the impo-
any study of this sort therefore . degree .. ~ maJOr problem in 
have attain. cd enough of th . 'b1~ ~tcrmmmg when sanctions 
f I 
cir o JCChvcs to be 'd 
cess u . Doxey defines an eff' . ' . . cons1 cred suc-
succccds in producing th d . c~llvc sa.ncl1on as "one which 
individual or group tow~· ~1.~e. behav10r~l response from the 
apparently straightforwar~c t~is1~ c~~~umcaled."1s Although 
question posed by Olson , d h. e m1l1on docs not answer the 
ated with compliance Olan ot . ers about the problems associ-
. · son pomts out th t ,,. · J~St ~hat is being attacked b the . ~ it is ?ften unclear 
Simphstic answer that 't . th y sanchons, aside from the 1 IS e economy 1119 
Hufbaucr and Schott r 'd · 
cess and a formula form p ov1. can altc~natc definition of suc-
an economic episode as C:i~un~g fcomphancc: "The success of 
sender country has two twc h rom the perspective of the pars: t c extent to h' h h 
outcome sought by the sender co . w ic ~ e policy 
the contribution made b ~ntry was m fact achieved, and 
H fb 
Y sanctions to a p ·t· 
u auer and Sch tt ..,1 , . os1 1vc outcomc."20 o g can their assess t f 
public statements of obJC. ct' d men o success from h 1vcs ma e by polic k 
owcvcr, the policy publi 1 yma crs. Clearly 
not be the same as the acl~;tr~~~~nccd by policymakers ma; 




Methods of Implementation 
The methods used to im lcm . 
outcome. Herc one nee~s t c~~ s~nchons often decide their 
covert measure; There o is~mguish between overt and 
S . . arc many instances of . f 
anchons are a public act and often coercion ailing. 
to save face in the international c the ~r~c~ state lacks a way 
pressure. Here, Weintraub ma ommumty If it succumbs to the 
profile public attempts at y be ~orrcct m arguing that lower-
r h d pcrsuas10n arc mo ·1 P is c . Publicity is what d. f . h re easI y accom-1s mgms cs a sanction from a covert 
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coercive attempt. A sanction "cannot be arbitrary or ad hoc: its 
existence must be generally known, and it must be regular in its 
incidcnce."21 Publicity also serves a useful function in that it 
sometimes satisfies a domestic requirement for. action. 
POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE METHODS 
A distinction needs to be made about the merits of the "carrot" 
and "stick" approaches to sanctions. Baldwin defines the carrot 
approach, or positive sanctions, as "actual or promised rewards 
to the target country," and negative sanctions as "actual or 
threatened punishments to the target country."22 Many observ-
ers, such as O'Leary, Baldwin, and Wallensteen, discount the 
effectiveness of negative sanctions and argue that the positive 
approach should be the policy tool of the future. Clearly, for the 
positive approach to make any sense, the benefits of compliance 
must outweigh the cost of the bribe for good behavior; also, the 
reward must be rendered when the target country complies 
with the sender's desires. 
On the other hand, a threat is only credible if it does not 
have to be instituted. Positive inducements may have a strength-
ening effect on the target economy; but what happens if the 
target country is a country that takes a stance of diametrical 
opposition to the survival of the sender country? There is some 
doubt that the sender would want to bolster the economy of an 
enemy state just for compliance with an international norm. 
REASONS FOR FAILURE 
Each of the factors mentioned above constitutes a reason for 
failure. Because compliance is difficult to obtain, success tends 
to be elusive. Objectives shift over time, and policymakers may 
be caught between conflicting goals. Often once sanctions occur, 
public resistance and resolve in the target state stiffen. The 
threat of punishment rather than the promise of a reward for 
compliance is also a common reason for failure. Galtung pos-
tulates that the critical variable in the success of a sanction is the 
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Another problem stems fro h 
even more vague concernin th m t e fact t~~t the literature is 
essary for a sanction to be g e set of conditions that are ncc-
laundry list of conditions ~~~~e:~~ i~o~:.authors have a long 
natcly, these authors 've us little u1 ive sen~. Unfortu-
or importance of th~ factors. sense of the relative strength 
The theory of sanctions is simplc:23 
1. The input-output t · f 
. ma nx o the receiving nation's econ-
omy rcv~als import dependence. 
2. Calculations arc made of the i . 
boycott of selected imports. mpact of partial or total 
3. A search is made for th · . 
effect with minimum b ose imports yielding maximum 
. oycott. 
4. The ideal case would be th 
boycott of one product alo~~ 0~~:?'J~ms~~f:~i~~ total 
Most observers believe that th "d 
involve a receiving nati'o h e I . cal set of conditions would 
n c aractenzcd by: 
1. I~rc;~~~~;.a very high loading on important sectors of 
2. Th~re is no. internal substitute for these im t 
3. ~~~~ load:~g of the important imports co:C:f:~m the 
h . g na ion(s); there are no external substitut f t ese imports so that th . . es or 
to change trade partne;:.ece1vmg nation cannot threaten 
4. Imports make up a v 11 
sending nation(s) a~J ::a part of the export of the 
substitutes for th;m. ere are no easily available 
5. ~~s'::~sc~~~m the receiving nation can easily be obtained 
6. ~~:~~;~~ast~~~~f the rcc~i~ing nation can easily be 
the rcce1vmg nation is an island).24 
. As Galtung notes, the case in h' h .. 
is usually where the target t ~ ic these cond1t1ons exist 
f ' coun ry is a small eco · 
o a major economic power I . h nom1c satellite 
and possibly even 90 pcrcc1~t ~; ~~~h a case, pcrh~ps 75 percent 
small country may be with th I exports and imports of the 
e arge country. At the same time>_ 
--------··· 
48 
Predicting the Success of Economic Sanctions 
this trade volume may still be less than 1 percent of the large 
country's total tradc.25 Clearly, in the Galtung case sanctions fail 
because few countries reach this level of vulnerability. 
A number of other factors contribute to the inability of 
sanctions to achieve their aims. Most often they involve prob-
lems of agreement and implementation among the imposing 
states. Failure can also occur because of failure to appreciate the 
reactions inside the target state and too much reliance on a naive 
theory of economic pressure leading to political disintcgration.
26 
Although it is difficult to evaluate the effects of sanctions 
applied in the past (because of the differing objectives of the 
imposing states and because the application of punitive meas-
ures cannot always be isolated from simultaneously occurring 
international events), there arc many instances where sanctions 
have proved ineffective. Britain and France were largely re-
sponsible for the failure of sanctions imposed against Italy in 
1935; they did not want to take any action that might alienate 
Mussolini and force closer Italian-German ties. Britain, in other 
words, feared aggression in Europe more than Italian aggres-
sion in Africa. This is a case where it was impossible to isolate 
sanctions from other (more important) international objectives. 
The sanctions campaign led by the United States against 
Cuba in the early 1960s similarly did not topple the communist 
government of Fidel Castro. In fact, sanctions had the reverse 
effect in that they helped to consolidate Castro's political posi-
tion and, if anything, strengthened internal support for the 
rcgime.27 Simultaneously, the imposition of sanctions opened 
up opportunities for Russian involvement. Consequently, Cuba 
moved entirely into the communist sphere, and the United States 
was left with almost no economic leverage to influence events 
in that country. The more recent enforcement of the UN-backed economic 
boycott against the former Rhodesian government also proved 
ineffective. The Security Council applied sanctions against 
Rhodesia a year after Rhodesia had declared independence (11 
November 1965). They failed largely because they were not 
upheld by South Africa, while simultaneously Rhodesian con-
servative clements increased their support for the survival of the 
regime. Ian Smith's government succeeded in softening the 
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natc markets and supplies and div . . 
ten. years after Rhodesia'; dcclar· crs.ifymg the economy. In the 
of industrial production ro b mg independence the volume 
1970 the range of output . se y 88 percent; and from 1963 to 
s . increased fro 60Z an~t~ons therefore spurred dcvclo m products to 3,837. 
sufficient indigenous economy pmcnt of a surprisingly sclf-
~lthough advocates of cc~ . . 
sanctions by the Organ· t' nomic coercion point out that 
0 
. . iza ion of Am · 5 
. ominican Republic (be . 1 cncan tatcs against the i~ toppling the Trujillo r~;~~ t~61) w~rc an important factor 
hons were applied was far t~ he pen~d during which sanc-
cffccts. Trui'illo who ~ ort to isolate their econom· 
' was assassmat d . 19 ic 
unpopular within and outside th ; i~ . 61, was immensely 
. Economic sanctions a ainst ;u omin.ican Republic. 
SoVIet Union and East E g goslavia and Albania by the 
cott against Israel by theuroApeban countri.cs, the economic boy-
f 
. ra countrie 
war are against North Korea and . s, as well as economic 
all proved ineffectual, althou h f Ch1~a by the United Nations 




aims t at there 1s c 'd 
w I c the US boycott of U ons1 crable evidence that 
sanctions proved devast t' gandan coffee failed, nonetheless 
helped set in motion the e~:~f to the Ugandan economy and 
regime. In that respect US ~ tha~ led to the fall of the Idi Amin 
Ho . ' sanctions wcr . d 
.wcvcr, Miller concedes that the U c m ccd successful. 
gmdancc as to how simil ·t . .gandan case provides little 
countries such as Iran th ar~ eps might ultimately affect other st.at~d actions and objdcti~es o~ict U1~ion, or South Africa. The 
d1ss1milar for any meaningful the d1ff~rent boycotts arc far too 
fore the whole question of th c~;~'p•mson. This brings to the 
c e ic1cncy of selective sanctions. 
OPERA TI ON AL CONSIDERATIONS 
The c?nsidcrations we have outline . 
selection of variables for t t' . d provide the basis for the 
(or success) of sanction: a ishcal tests that follow. The failure 
spectrum of factors. seems to be dependent on a wide 
. Inadequate international cnfor 
mam reasons for past failures of ccme~t has been one of the 
members of the international bod sanctions. States that arc Y may prefer to avoid or post-
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pone decisions to enforce sanctions because they will not bear 
the accompanying risks and costs. The weaker the system 
(because of the diversity of values), the more likely are doubts 
and hesitations. It is therefore unrealistic to expect all countries 
to cooperate fully in imposing a total embargo against a target 
state. The lack of universality of application has indeed been a 
major cause of the failure of sanctions in the cases mentioned 
above. The existence of nonparticipating countries often dras-
tically lessened the target state's vulnerability to external eco-
nomic pressures and so eroded the psychological effects of the 
sanctions policy. 
A second important factor in the inability of sanctions to 
achieve their objectives has been the fail\ire of the imposing 
states to anticipate fully the response within the target state. The 
assumption that there is a proportional relationship between 
economic deprivation and political disintegration has in most 
cases proved to be a fallacy. Political collapse in the wake of 
economic disaster has been the exception rather than the rule. 
Indeed, economic sanctions have generally had the opposite 
effect by creating a sense of solidarity in the target state, similar 
to wartime spirit of resistance.29 Most countries that have been 
subjected to economic pressure have grown more reluctant to 
accept change and the population more ready to bear economic 
punishment. 
Third, history has shown that most states implement safe-
guards to soften the impact of sanctions. Methods used are 
stockpiling, finding other markets, diversifying the economic 
structure of the country, buying illegally even when proved to 
be more expensive, and diverting the economic effects away 
from the politically dominant social groups. 
The scant success achieved by imposing states also results 
from the inequitable burden of costs. Some imposing countries 
have more to lose than others and therefore feel that the price 
they have to pay is not proportionate. Countries that have to 
pay the highest price resent the universal implementation of 
economic warfare the most and are therefore more likely to 
evade it. Within countries, some sectors of the economy will be 
affected more than others, leading to feelings of resentment 
among those who have to pay the highest price. 
The failure of sanctions in the past does not imply, of course, 
· " -· - --~ ~i"'""c:. nc>2'lil?ible. Lindsay proposes 
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that sanctions fail because of the ff 
goals of compliance and sub .e ect that publicity has on the 
a positive effect on the goals ovfe:sxton, e".'en though publicity has 
bol . E . m ernatxonal and do t' ism. lhngs believes that th £. ·1 . mes ic sym-
change in the structural trend c ;1 t~res are attributable to the 
eludes that sanctions must l sio e global system; he con-( · 1 · • · x· ll nt <.•rslood on · . . • l w1t 1111 the context of th · t . • a case- )y-casc basis 
e in ernational s ·t. ) D · · tratcs on the problem of. t . ys cm . oxcy concen-
causc..• of failure. m crnahonal enforcement as the main 
Hufbauer and Schott list several limitations of sanctions: 
1. The means used ma be 
2. The sanctions them y not adequate for the task. 
3. Allies of the target c:lvtes may create an antidote. 
may be a backlash abr~:~ :"J ~~port its ca~S:'.or there 
sanctions. a omc to the m1tiation of 
Each of these explanati . f £. · 
tive validity. ons or allure of sanctions has intui-
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Clearly, sanctions work or fail { r . 
tentative hypothesis is th t th o a van~ty of reasons. One 
there are clements lead· a e outcome is multidimensional; 
individual case. Whcthe~~ ~o succe~ .and to failure in any 
fails depends on the ex· t otfa spcc1f1c sanction succeeds or 
£. 1s ence o some c b" . actors. These must bes ff . om ma!lon of positive 
to undermine the policie~ ~~~~nt to of~sct.those clements tending 
this sense docs not necessar'J ~ sanlchonmg states. "Success" in 
• 
1 ymvo veoneu · . stances; instead we ma . . rnque set of c1rcum-
combinations that woul~ ::~gme seve:~l factors in differing 
come. to a positive for negative) out-
Three elements are necessary to test our hypothesis: 
~. An acceptable measure of success 
· A set of hypothesized c d · · 
sanctions on ihons concerning successful 
3. A method of testing th 1 · 
and the outcome of sac re t~hons between these conditions 
nc 10ns 
.... m 
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The sanction literature we have surveyed has sought sim-
plifying strategies to assess sanctions. Simplification has merit, 
but it can lead to the overlooking of useful information. 
One common oversimplified approach is to seek a single 
differentiating trait or set of traits to characterize sets of sanc-
tions. Here, sanctions are arbitrarily classed as successful or un-
successful and then attention focused on only those items for 
which the groups had statistically significant differences. Al-
though it provides some useful insights, there arc serious con-
ceptual problems with this approach. By analyzing and inter-
preting each characteristic associated with a set of sanctions 
independently from other facets, this approach obviously ig-
nores the multidimensional nature of sanctions. 
Another approach that also may prove insufficient exam-
ines the relationships among the characteristics associated with 
past sanctions to find the profile of successful and unsuccessful 
episodes. Comparisons and contrasts of a new sanction situ-
ation are then made on this basis. For example, using this 
approach successful sanctions may have a profile where the 
United States or other large industrial nation(s) has dealt with 
a smaller developing country. Here, success was more likely if 
the target country did not receive aid from another industrial 
country. Using this profile, we might regard a potentially 
successful sanction situation as likely to fail if it did not fit this 
profile. 
Both the above strategics, however, are likely to result in 
poor predictions simply because the characteristics of successful 
sanctions are not particularly uniform with respect to any single 
measure. Besides, it appears that they may be compensatory in 
nature (i.e., one favorable characteristic may well affect another, 
unfavorable characteristic). It is probable that even highly dif-
ferentiating conditions can be moderated by minimally acces-
sible or adequate levels on other conditions, or environments. 
Is there an alternative to these highly oversimplified strate-
gies? A successful line ofanalysis should: 
1. Consider all pertinent data from each sanction episode, 
while considering individual differences that arc certain 
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2. Provide estimates of the likelihood . 
under consideration will obtai that ~~e sanctions 
success-an especiall . f 1 ~ a prespccificd level of procedure is to be of ~al~~ ~~a ~~et if the assessment 
3. Provide feedb k po icymakers 
data themselv:~ concerning the appropriateness of the 
One analytical approach t h 
multiple discriminant analysis ~~D~~~:sment of sanctions is 
has often focused on profile relationshi. n past research, MDA 
However, the technique can classify i~~ ~~n~ sc:veral groups. 
Herc we make use of this s "f iv1 ua s mto a group. 
provide the best statist1·calpbec1.1c(~spect of MDA: its ability to 
. as1s m a least-sq 
computmg estimates of the s ecifi ... uares sense) for 
tion to achieve prcspccificd p rfo c probab1htics of a new sanc-
the focus here is on individupcl rmd ance levels. In summary, 
B a s an not groups Y way of review MDA · . . · 
suits in the reduction ~f the m~~t~ ~ta(tishc~I procedure that re-
one or more additive b" .P c profile) measurements to 
. . com mations of tho 
combinations or com .t se scores. These 
provide the basis for:~ ~ scores£ arc important because they 
As a first step MDA VIlngl per ormance probabilities. 
' ca cu ates a set of . h b 
characteristics associated w·th h ~cig ts ascd on the 
· · · 
1 cac sanction Th · mm1m1ze the differences in the . . csc weights 
cases in the same pcrf composite scores of the sanction 
ormancc groups ( f 
cessful) and maximize d.f£ success ul and unsuc-
. 1 ierences among gr Th. Jte score is the single best idenff . oups. is compos-
probable group membership. I ication of a future sanction's 
Estimation 
A~ noted above, a critical first ste in h . 
pnor classification of sanctio P t e MDA approach 1s the 
unsuccessful. In part we hav ns i?to groups: successful and 
the classification of sanct1· eta voided several controversies in 
• onou comesbys· 1 . and Schotl's classification schcm, . . 1?1P y using Hutbauer 
analysis of the historical d c. lt 1s unlikely that any further 
l · recor would sig T I · t 1e1r assessments about . .d Ill icant y improve on 
mc1 ents of success or failure. 
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Hufbauer and Schott's classification scheme is based on the 
multiplication of a policy result indicator (1-failed outcome to 
4-successful outcome) by a sanction contribution indicator (1-
negative contribution to 4-significant contribution). The re-
sulting index yields a success score from 1 to 16. For purposes 
of classification for the discriminant analysis, successful sanc-
tions have scores higher than 7. Conversely, those with scores 
lower than 8 were classified as failures. 
The second step is the selection of variables for the MDA. 
Here the variables31 selected were mentioned in the literature as 
likely to have a bearing on the eventual outcome of any individ-
ual sanction. The variable chosen on this basis fell into four 
broad groups:32 (1) economic variables, (2) political variables, (3) 
geographical variables, and (4) military variables (see Table 1). 
The first step in the analysis was to factor analyze the 
variables listed above. Thus through determining common 
variance among them, it was possible to reduce the number of 
independent variables for the discriminant analysis, and to 
select variables largely uncorrelated with one another. For this 
purpose, we selected the principal components method of factor 
analysis (with each factor having an eigenvalue of at least 1.0). 
The seven factors that met this criterion were then orthodog-
onally rotated using Kaiser's varimax procedure. These factors 
collectively accounted for 87.3 percent of the total variance in the 
matrix. 
The variables with the highest loading on each factor were: 
(1) PERIOD, (2) SGNP, (3) COST/CAPITA, (4) SRECION, (5) 
COST/TARGET, (6) INTLHELP, and (7) STABILITY. 
The next step in the analysis was to introduce these vari-
ables one by one in a discriminant analysis of our total sample 
of sanctions (the 105 cases listed in Hufbauer and Schott)33 to · 
find the maximum separation of the successful sanction group 
from those events previously classified as failures. The results 
(Table 2) were somewhat disappointing, with only 78 percent of 
the sanctions correctly identified by the discriminating vari-
ables. In other words, a framework based on the seven variables 
listed above enabled us to predict the correct outcome of future 





Variables Used in the Analysis 
Economic variables 
(a) cost of the sanction34 t h 
(b) cost as a percenta e of o t e tar~et country (COST /TGT) 
(c) cost per capita (C~T /~~~I~~;onal product (COST /GNP) 
(d) trade linkagc3s (TRADE) 
(e) GNP rati · d (f) t f o. ~n er to target (GNPRA TIO) ype o sanction36 (TYPE) . 
(g) cost to the sender (COSTSENDER) (~)sender's GNP (SCNP) 
(~) target's GNP (TGNP) 
(J) sender industry37 (SINDUS) 
(k) target industry (TINDUS) 
((I) )target export concentration38 (TCON) m target commod"t (n) tar . 1 Y concentration39 (TCOMM) 
( ) get import concentration4o (TIMPORT) 
o target merchandise export index•' (TMEX) 
Political variables 
(a) ~ompanion policies42 (COMPOLICY) 
(b) international coo r . 
(c) international assi:~c~otn ~th the sender43 (INTCO) 
(d) sanction period45 (PERI;D) e target« (INTLHELP) 
(e) h~alth and stability index46 (STABILITY 
(() pnor relations indcx47 (PRIOR) ) 
(g) target govemment4B (TGOVT) 
Geographic variables 
(a) sender population (SPOP) 
(b) target population (TPOP) 
(c) target area (T AREA) 
(d) sender area (SAREA) 
(e) target urbanization49 (URBN) 
(f) target higher education ind x5o 
(g) target regions' (TRECION) e (EDUCATION) 
(h) sender region (SRECION) 
---~..,...,,..._..--··· 
Table 1 (cont'd.) 
Military variables 
s2 (TARMED> (a} target armed forces ($ARMED) 
(b} sender armed forcesod -~3 1·5PROD) 
. rms pr UCCI \ (c} sender .1s an a ducer (TPROD> (d} target is an arms pro 
Table 2 . . 
. With Successful Sanctions. 
Factors Associat~d . . t Analysis Results 
Preliminary Discnmman 











Pre-World INTCO TREGION War II PERIOD 
86/15 82.5 
Post-World COST/CAPITA INTL HELP 
































Data sources: G. Hufbauer and J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Wash-
ington: Institute for International Economics, 1985); World Bank, World Devel-
opment Report (New York: Oxford University Press, various issues); C. Taylor 
and 0. Jodicc, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 3rd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). 
Next, to find if our predictability of future sanctions could 
be increased, the analysis focused on several subgroupings of 
cases. Herc, the literature provides some guidance about group-
ing that might produce significant differences: 
1. Pre-World War II vs. post-World War II cases. The 
assumption is that the post-World War II cases occurred much 
more frequently and as such applied in situations less likely to 
be successful. 
2. Non-US-instigated sanctions vs. US-instigated sanctions. 
The assumption is that the United States, as the most powerful 
economy through most of the period under consideration, would 
be more likely to achieve success than smaller, less influential 
countries. 
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In each case, the methodology used was identical with our 
analysis of the total sample: (1) the subgroup of sanction cases 
were factor analyzed, (2) variables loading most heavily on each 
factor were selected for a discriminant analysis, and (3) the 
stepwise discriminant analysis classified sanctions as successful 
or unsuccessful for comparison with that of the groupings based 
on Hufbauer and Schott's classification. 
Again the results were not particularly encouraging (Table 
2). Although the analysis correctly identified 9 out of 10 prc-
World War I cases, it incorrectly identified 15 out of 86 post-
World War II cases. Similarly, 7 out of 28 non-US-instigated 
sanctions were misclassified, as were 14 out of 67 instigated by 
the United States. 
An investigation was also made of several other subgroup-
ings in an attempt to improve the degree of predictability. Logi-
cally, the objectives of the sanctions themselves should influence 
the intensity of the methods used in implementation, the pre-
sumption here being that the will of the sanctioning country and 
that of the target country is a function of the stakes involved. 
Hufbauer and Schott list five major objectives: (1) modest 
change in target policies, (2) destabilization of target govern-
ments, (3) disruption of military adventures, (4) impairment of 
military potential, and (5) other major changes in target policy. 
As in the cases above, factor and stepwise discriminant analysis 
examined the extent to which successful sanctions could be 
differentiated from those that failed. 
The first grouping based on objectives of the target country 
involves modest changes in the target country's policies. These 
episodes begin with the United Kingdom vs. USSR in 1933, and 
end with the United States vs. Zimbabwe in 1983. The three 
statistically significant variables used in differentiating between 
successful and unsuccessful cases were: (1) companion policies, 
(2) sender's GNP, and (3) sender's region. However, these 
variables classified nine countries incorrectly (Table 3). Also, the 
probability of classification of those countries correctly grouped 
was not particularly high. 
f 
Table 3 
Modest Changes in Target Country Policies 
Sender /target 
Classification Percentage 
UK vs. USSR, 1933 
correct 
US/UK vs. Mexico, 1938 successful 86.9 
USSR vs. Australia, 1954 successful 85.9 
US/UK vs. Egypt, 1956 unsuccessful 63.8 
US vs. Ceylon, 1961 su.ccessfuI 96.1 
USSR vs. Romania, 1962 successful 74.9 
US vs. UAR, 1963 unsuccessful 66.6 
France vs. Tunisia, 1964 successful 72.7 
US vs. Chile, 1965 successful 50.S 
US vs. India, 1965 successful 67.S 
US vs. Peru, 1968 successful 69.8 
US vs. Peru, 1968 unsuccessful 36.7* 
US vs. South Korea, 1973 successful 63.3 
US vs. Chile, 1973 unsuccessful 58.S 
Canada vs. India, 1974 unsuccessful 62.8 
Canada vs. Pakistan 1974 unsuccessful 15.6* 
US/Canada vs. Sou(h unsuccessful 16.6* 
Korea, 1974 
US vs. USSR 1975 successful 35.9* us I unsuccessful vs. Eastern Europe, 1975 62.3 
US vs. South Africa, 1975 successful 37.2* 
US vs. Uruguay, 1976 unsuccessful 62.8 
US vs. Taiwan, 1976 unsuccessful 68.7 
US vs. Ethiopia, 1976 successful 31.2* 
US vs. Paraguay, 1977 unsuccessful 68.8 
US vs. Guatemala, 1977 unsuccessful 75.1 
US vs. Argentina, 1977 unsuccessful 75.2 
Canada vs. Japan, 1977 unsuccessful 76.0 
US vs. El Salvador, 1977 successful 83.4 
US vs. Brazil, 1978 unsuccessful 75.1 
China vs. Albania, 1978 successful 24.9* 
US vs. Brazil, 1978 unsuccessful 47.8* 
unsuccessful 81.7 
(cont'd.) 
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Table 3 (cont'd.} 
Sender I target Classification 
Percentage 
correct 
unsuccessful 82·0 US vs. Argentina, 1978 unsuccessful 81.9 
US vs. India, 1978 unsuccessful 86.9 
US vs. USSR, 1978 successful 93.5 
US vs. Iran, 19
7
9 unsuccessful ~::;. 
US vs. Pakistan, 1979 1979 successful 
Arab League vs. Canada, unsuccessful 86.9 
us vs. Bolivia, 1979 unsuccessful 51.1 US vs. Iraq, 1980 . 1982 successful 51.2 
Netherlands vs. Sunnam, 82 successful 99.6 
South Africa vs. Lesotho, 19 unsuccessful 80.5 
Australia vs. France, 1983 unsuccessful 94.0 
US vs. USSR, 1983 unsuccessful 94·2 US vs. Zimbabwe, 1983 .. 
. discriminant analysis. T d case Variables used m . Notes: • reprcsents.n:iiscla2ss~:dcr GNP, and (3) sender region. (1) companion policies, ( ) 
. n ob·ectives involves those wit.h 
The second set ~~ sa~c~10of th~ target government. This 
the intent of desta.bihzat~o d Kin dom vs. Russia in 1918, a~d 
grouping begins with Umte 5 g Grenada in 1983. He~e, six 
ends with United States/OEC vs. lysis were significant m the 
variables derived from the~~c~~r :~only one case being incor-
differentiating process <:ad eSt 'tes vs. Argentina in 1944). 
rectly classified (the Umte a 
I 
Predicting the Success of Economic Sanctions 
61 
Table 4 
Modest Changes in Target Country Policies 
Sender I target 
Classification Percentage 
correct 
UK vs. Russia, 1918 
unsuccessful 100.0 US vs. Argentina, 1944 
unsuccessful 9.0* USSR vs. Yugoslavia, 1948 
unsuccessful 99.9 UK/US vs. Iran, 1951 
· successful 99.9 US vs. Laos, 1956 
successful 99.9 USSR vs. Finland, 1958 
successful 90.9 US vs. Dominican Rep., 1969 
successful 99.9 US vs. Cuba, 1960 
unsuccessful 99.9 USSR vs. Albania, 1961 
unsuccessful 99.8 US vs. Brazil, 1962 
successful 92.3 US vs. Indonesia, 1963 
unsuccessful 95.3 US vs. South Vietnam, 1963 
successful 99.9 US vs. Chile, 1970 
successful 99.9 US/UK vs. Uganda, 1972 
successful 94.7 US vs. Nicaragua, 1977 
successful 93.9 US vs. Libya, 1978 
unsuccessful 99.6 US vs. Nicaragua, 1981 
unsuccessful 99.9 
Notes: • rcpn•scnls misclassifi<..•d case. Variables used in discriminant analysis: 
(1) international assistance to target, (2) prior relations index, and (3) trade linkage. 
Disruption of military adventures Cother than major wars) 
was the third grouping based on objectives of the sanctioning 
states. This grouping begins with the League of Nations vs. 
Yugoslavia in 1921, and ends with the United Kingdom vs. 
Argentina in 1982. For this group of sanctions, the factor analy-
sis produced two significant, differing variables: target higher 
education index and the target region. These two variables 
produced only one misclassified case ff able 5). 
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Table 5 
Disruption of Military Adventures 
(other than major wars) 
Sender/target 
League vs. Yugoslavia, 1921 
League vs. Greece, 1925 
League vs. Paraguay, 1932 
League vs. Italy, 1935 
US vs. japan, 1940 
US vs. Netherlands, 1948 
US vs. China, 1949 
US vs. UK/France, 1956 
France vs. Tunisia, 1957 
US vs. Cuba, 1960 
US vs. India/Pakistan, 1971 
US vs. Turkey, 1974 
China vs. Vietnam, 1978 
































Noles:• represents misclassified case. Variables used in discriminant analysis: 
(1) target higher education index, and (2) target region. 
The fourth set of groupings based on objectives involve 
cases that fall under the goal of impairment of military potential 
(including major wars). This grouping begins with the United 
Kingdom vs. Germany in 1941, and ends with the United States 
vs. the Soviet Union in 1981. Three variables proved to be 
sufficient to differentiate between success and failure in attain-
ing the desired objective: (1) cost to the target, (2) type of sanc-
tion, and (3) cost to the sender. They predicted the correct 
outcome in each case, and produced a probability of correct 
placement of 100 percent in each case (Table 6). 
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Table 6 
Impai_rment_of Military Potential 
(mcludmg major wars) 
63 
Sender I target Classification Percentage correct 
UK_ vs. Germany, 1914 
Alliance vs. Ger./Japan, 1939 
Arabs vs. Israel, 1946 
US/COCOM vs. USSR, 1948 
US vs. China, 1949 
US/UN vs. North Korea 1950 
US/S. Vietnam vs. ' 
N. Vietnam, 1954 
USSR vs. China, 1960 
US vs. USSR, 1980 





















Note: Variables used in di'scn· . 
mmant analysi · (1) 
sanction, and (3) cost to the sender. s. cost to the target, (2) type of 
The final grouping b b. · . 
ing major changes in tar ye~ j~~hvc mv~l~es the goal of achiev-
grouping bcmns with Un~t d St ntry pohc1cs. Historically, this 
. o· I e ates vs Jap . 1917 
with the sanction of the E . an m 'and ends 
19 . uropean Commu .t T . 81. Five variables idenff db m Y vs. urkey m 
tistically significant in d1.ffe1 ic ti. ~ the factor analysis were sta-
rcn atmg this gr f . 
cost as a percen tagc of GNP (2) ou Po sanctmns: (1) linkage, (4) cost per capita, and 5 cost to the t~rget, (3) trade 
variables resulted in a perfect cl ( ~/YP~ of sanction. These five 
with impairment of militar ~ss1 ~cat10n scheme (Table 7). As 
ment in the correct categoryy ~o entiahl, the probability of placc-
or cac case was 100 percent. 
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Table 7 
. c untry Policies Other Changes m Target o . 





1917 unsuccessful UK vs. Japan, b d 1948 successful 
India vs. Hyder a/F, 1948 unsuccessful 
USSR vs US/UK ranee, f 1 
· 1954 unsuccess u India vs. Portugal, unsuccessful 
· UK 1954 Spam vs. ' unsuccessful 
US vs. Israel, 1956 nsucccssful 
Indonesia vs. Neth., 1957 ~nsuccessful 
· GDR 1961 Alhes vs. ' 1 . 1963 unsuccessful Indonesia vs. Ma ~ysi~963 unsuccessful UN vs. South Afnca, ful 
1963 unsuccess UN vs. Portugal, 1965 unsuccessful 
US vs Arab League, f 1 
· . 1967 success u Nigeria vs. B1afra, 
Arab League vs. 
US/Neth., 1973 
Arab League vs. Egypt, 1978 
US vs. Portugal, 1981 






















. . iminant analysis: (1) cost as a percentage of GN~f 
Note: Variables used m discr d linka c (4) cost per capita, and (5) type 
(2) cost to the target, (3) tra e g , 
sanction. 
CONCLUSIONS 
. ts that it is very difficult to predict 
The foregoing analysis sugges mon thread is present in 
the outcome of sanctions. %~ ~;eu~:ccessful, for that matt~r). 
the cases that were success 75 rcent chance of pred1ct-
Countries today have on~y abo~tl:arl{predicting the degree of 
ing the outcome of sanction~ Schott S::ale would be even more 
success on the Hufbaucr an 
problematic. 
r 
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On the other hand, it appears that our predictive capability 
increases significantly when the objectives of the sanctions are 
known. In fact, this predictive capability reaches 100 percent in 
several important categories. Apparently, having information 
about the costs of the sanctions, together with information on 
trade linkages, would be sufficient to predict the outcome of the 
event with nearly 100 percent accuracy for sanctions involving 
impairment of military potential, and those involving other 
major changes in the target country's policies. 
There is one major caveat: in a context broader than the one 
defined above, sanctions may well fail in a foreign policy objec-
tive, but still be classed as a success by the government (and 
public opinion).54 This could easily occur if they meet public 
demands for "strong" action or, alternatively, if they stave off 
demands to use military force. This aside, the distressing find-
ing from the above analysis is that in most instances there is not 
a common clement assuring success. 
In each of the other groupings, sanctions appear to involve 
a set of variables that arc unique to that type of sanction. Even 
then they arc incapable of providing lCX) percent accuracy in 
classification. Interestingly enough, as the importance of the 
objective increases, our ability to predict the likely outcome 
increases. This lends credence to the assertion that the will of 
the sanctioning states is critical. The determination of these 
countries to pursue their actions against the target may, in the 
final assessment, be the most important clement determining 
the ultimate outcome of the sanctions. 
Finally, until the time of 100 percent predictability comes, 
policymakers should realize that only 34 percent of the sanc-
tions since 1914 have (by our definition of success) been success-
ful. To initiate a sanction that has a small chance of success in 
the first place is poor policy. It is even poorer policy to initiate 
sanctions without clearly defining their objectives; this simply 
increases the likelihood that they will be applied in situations 
where the chances of failure arc even greater. 
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